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INTRODUCTION 
The Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") raises several legal arguments in its 
opposing brief that require response. Most importantly, however, UBMC insists on 
repeating an unsubstantiated factual claim. UBMC repeatedly asserts that its reason for 
tenninating the professional services contract (the "Agreement") with Dr. Hardy was that 
Dr. Hardy's services no longer met the medical needs of the Uintah Basin community. In 
the days and weeks before and after he was fired, Dr. Hardy was never told his services 
weren't satisfactory. In fact, UBMC never claimed Dr. Hardy's services no longer met 
the medical needs of the community until well into discovery, when UBMC realized it 
would have to come up with some legal reason for terminating Dr. Hardy. And no 
UBMC administrator or physician ever testified that there was any concern about the 
adequacy of Dr. Hardy's services. UBMC simply decided to fire Dr. Hardy because an 
opportunity arose to hire a physician, Dr. Thomas J. Allred, who could work both in the 
emergency room and as a pathologist. UBMC did not have, and would not have in the 
conceivable future, enough work to hire a full-time pathologist. But by hiring Dr. Allred, 
UBMC could claim to have an on-site, resident pathologist in rural Utah. In the 
competitive world of rural medicine, such bragging rights might give UBMC a chance to 
lure patients away from nearby Ashley Valley Medical Center, located 70 miles away in 
Vernal, Utah. Dr. Hardy's contract was merely a pesky legal obstacle, and UBMC called 
in its lawyers to take care of i t 
1 
This factual background is not, as may seem at first blush, gratuitous. It is critical, 
for it underscores why this Court must adopt a rule of law in Utah that requires 
governmental entities to honor legitimate, beneficial contracts, while at the same time not 
impeding successor governments' ability to respond to the electorate's demands and the 
population's needs.1 Without a clear, policy-based legal test to determine the 
enforceability of long-term government contracts, trial courts will continue to flounder 
when assessing the enforceability of extended contracts with government entities. The 
unilateral avoidance of such contracts will allow UBMC to entice talented professionals 
to work for them by offering long-term contracts, and then, when a better deal 
fortuitously comes along, they can void the contract and escape paying damages. Not 
only would this injustice affect those contracting with government, like Dr. Hardy, but it 
would also adversely affect government entities like UBMC: 
"It is obvious that a too rigid adherence to the principal [that successors 
should not be bound to some contracts] would leave [government entities] 
nursing a mere theory—in the possession of an important governmental 
power without practical means for its exercise, and unable to take any 
important public work, since no concern would equip itself and undertake 
the project when the incoming administration, the product perhaps of 
1
 Because this appeal comes before the Court after the entry of summary judgment 
on stipulated facts, and because this Court must address only the legal question of 
whether UBMC could void the Agreement as improperly binding successor 
boards, there is no factual record on appeal. The many contested facts in this case 
do not need to be resolved for this Court to determine whether the rule of law 
invoked by UBMC applies in Utah. However, these facts are important to 
illustrate the problems inherent in allowing government entities to void contracts 
at will. 
2 
political accident, might repudiate the contract at will during its 
performance/'2 
Because the consequences for government and private citizens alike are enormous, 
this Court should adopt a policy-based case-by-case test for determining whether a 
municipal contract is enforceable beyond the term of the appointed officers who initially 
entered the contract. Under such a test, this Court should find that, as a matter of law, Dr. 
Hardy's contract is enforceable because it did not impair future boards' pohcy-making 
role, it was necessary and advantageous at the time it was entered into, and the "just 
cause" provision allowed future UBMC boards of trustees to terminate the Agreement if 
Dr. Hardy's services ever failed to meet the community's medical needs. Alternatively, 
this Court should remand this case to the trial court for a further factual development of 
whether, under the circumstances, Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was justified. 
ARGUMENT 
L UBMC'S ASSERTION THAT DR. HARDY'S SERVICES NO LONGER 
MET THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY IS SIMPLY A 
PRETEXT AND UNDERSCORES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
A RULE THAT WILL ALLOW ENFORCEMENT OF BENEFICIAL, 
LONG-TERM GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
When UBMC gave Dr. Hardy 90 days notice that it was terminating the 
Agreement, it never informed Dr. Hardy that the pathology services he provided no 
longer met the community's medical needs. In fact, UBMC gave no official reason for 
2
 Mariano & Associates, P.C. v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 329 
(Wyo. 1987). (quoting Plant Food v. City of Charlotte, 199 SJE. 712 (1938)). 
3 
terminating the Agreement. Prior to Dr. Hardy's termination, UBMC never surveyed or 
questioned the UBMC medical staff to determine if a resident pathologist was critical to 
the hospital's needs or if Dr. Hardy was not providing the pathology services needed by 
UBMC. It was not until UBMC filed its memorandum opposing Dr. Hardy's first motion 
for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim that UBMC began arguing it had 
"just cause" to terminate the Agreement. 
The supposed failure of Dr. Hardy to meet the community's medical needs was an 
afterthought conjured up by UBMC to mask its desire to hire another doctor who they 
thought might be a "better deal." After Dr. Hardy's motion for summary judgment and 
UBMC's cross motion for summary judgment were denied, Dr. Hardy began the 
discovery process. Although Dr. Hardy deposed key UBMC administrators and 
physicians, no one ever testified that UBMC had concluded that Dr. Hardy's services 
were inadequate. In fact, UBMC's chief administrator, Bradley LeBaron, admitted 
during his deposition that—when Dr. Hardy pointed out UBMC did not have "just cause" 
to tenninate the Agreement—he informed Dr. Hardy that UBMC's lawyers would find a 
way out. 
It took a while. After extensive discovery, Dr. Hardy renewed his motion for 
summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, and UBMC renewed its cross-
motion. UBMC argued in its renewed cross-motion that the Agreement was terminable 
"at will," or that the court must infer a two-year duration, or that UBMC had legitimate 
4 
business reasons to terminate the Agreement (See R. 524-26.) In its reply brief, UBMC 
raised for the first time in more than three years of litigation, the legal argument that 
contracts with governmental entities are not enforceable beyond the term of the officers 
who entered into the contract, and thus the Agreement had been legally terminated. 
This fact scenario epitomizes why courts have criticized as unsound a rule of law 
that allows government entities to enter into a long-term contract when it is convenient 
and later repudiate it: " \ . . we know of no reason why a city, as well as an individual, 
should not be expected to keep faith with those with whom it contracts, or else respond in 
damages for its failure." Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392, 397 (Cal. 
1943) (en banc), rev 'd on other grounds, Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972). 
Because governmental entities should be required to honor their contractual 
obligations unless the contract actually does impair that entity's ability to enact policy, 
this Court should adopt a test that will allow enforcement of long-term contracts that are 
appropriate under the circumstances. As discussed below, Dr. Hardy and UBMC agree 
that Utah should adopt a policy-based test that allows trial courts to analyze the factual 
background and policy implications of long term government contracts to determine 
whether they are enforceable. 
5 
H. DR. HARDY AND UBMC AGREE THAT THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
A POLICY-BASED CASE-BY-CASE TEST FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER A CONTRACT BINDING A GOVERNING BODY'S 
SUCCESSORS IS ENFORCEABLE 
Both UBMC and Dr. Hardy urge this Court to reject the governmental/proprietary 
test and adopt a case-by-case approach to determining whether a contract binding a 
governmental body's successors is enforceable. While Dr. Hardy urges a modified Plant 
Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (N.C. 1938) test, {see Hardy Br. at 25-
28), UBMC argues primarily for the test articulated in Mariano & Associatesy P.C. v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 737 P.2d 323, 331-32 (Wyo. 1987). (UBMC Br. at 17, 
31.) Specifically, Dr. Hardy has asked this Court to adopt a test which focuses on 
"'whether the enforcement of the contract would impair, to any significant degree, the 
new body's exercise of its policymaking role.5" (Hardy Br. at 26 (quoting Lobolito, Inc. 
v. NorthPocono Sch Dist, 722 A.2d 249, 252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)), rev'don other 
grounds, 755 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2000).) The Mariano test that UBMC urges requires a 
court to determine whether "the necessity and benefit to the governmental unit" justified 
the long-term contract when it was entered into. Mariano, 737 P.2d 329. If the duration 
of the contract was justified at the time the agreement was made, the contract must be 
enforced against successors. Id. Thus Plant Food focuses on whether the contract 
impinges on policymaking, whereas Mariano focuses on whether the contract was 
beneficial at the time the contract was entered into. 
6 
A. This Court Should Use Mariano's Test As Factors To Consider Under 
the Modified Plant Food Test 
The difference between the tests Dr. Hardy and UBMC advocate is minimal. In 
fact, the Mariano test UBMC urges is, like the test Dr. Hardy advocates, derived from 
Plant Food See Mariano, 131 P.2d at 329 ("In reasoning, we generally follow the 
principal case, Plant Food Co, v. City of Charlotte . . . . "). Dr. Hardy agrees that the 
Mariano test—whether the contract was "necessary" and "beneficial to" the government 
at the time it was made—provides useful factors for detenniiiing whether a long-term 
government contract is enforceable against successors. Indeed, this Court should, in 
fashioning an appropriate policy-based test, suggest specific factors for trial courts to 
examine in determining whether a contract improperly impairs future elected officials' 
policymaking ability. To that end, Dr. Hardy urges this Court not to adopt the Mariano 
test as is, but rather to use the test as factors to consider in making the ultimate 
assessment of whether the contract "impairfs], to any significant degree, the new body's 
exercise of its policymaking role." Hence the resulting test should primarily focus on 
policymaking considerations and secondarily focus on the utility of the contract at issue. 
Janice Griffith, perhaps the leading commentator on the deficiencies of the 
governmental/proprietary test for municipal contracts, suggests five factors to 
determine whether a long-term municipal contract should be upheld. A contract 
must be enforced if: 
the formation of the contract is not the result of fraud, corruption, or bad 
faith; (2) the contract does not modify the legal structure under which the 
governmental body is organized and operates; (3) the contract advances a 
governmental interest that outweighs the loss of governmental control; (4) 
7 
If this Court does decide, however, to adopt the Mariano test as is, then Dr. 
Hardy's contract is enforceable. 
B. Under the Mariano Test Advocated by UBMC, Dr. Hardy's Contract Is 
Enforceable Because, Under the Circumstances, A "Just Cause" 
Contract Was Justified 
Because Dr. Hardy's "just cause" contract was necessary and appropriate under 
the circumstances, it is enforceable, as a matter of law, against UBMC successor boards 
under Mariano. Although UBMC does not explain why the Mariano test should be 
adopted, the standard does have several advantages over the governmental/proprietary 
test, including a detailed description of the parties' burdens, and cogent guidelines for 
instructing trial courts how to determine whether a contract is enforceable. 
First and foremost, Mariano recognizes that the policy rationale for banning long-
term government contracts is central to fashioning any test for determining their 
enforceability.4 As noted above, Mariano, closely follows Plant Food Co. v. City of 
Charlotte, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (N.C. 1938), the case Dr. Hardy uses for his proposed test 
the contract restrains the operation of governmental functions no further than 
necessary and for no longer than necessary to accomplish governmental 
objectives; and (5) circumstances have not so changed as to cause the 
contract's continued performance to result in substantial harm to the public. 
Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the 
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IowaL. Rev. 277, 348 (1990). 
4
 While Mariano acknowledged the importance of the policy underlying the ban on 
long-term government contracts, the Mariano test fails to actually ensure that this 
important policy is not undermined, since the test only focuses on the utility of 
the contract. 
8 
{See Appellant's Br. at 25-28.) In fashioning its rule, the Mariano 
Court explained: 
In reasoning, we generally follow the principal case, Plant Food Co. v. City 
of Charlotte, involving a contract to remove sludge where the court stated: 
"It is not to be supposed that because the general 
subject may belong to the field of government powers no 
detail of administration may be carried out by contract, or that 
such contract must be completed within the term of the 
contracting council. The true test is whether the contract 
itself deprives a governing body, or its successor, of a 
discretion which public policy demands should be left 
unimpaired." 
Id. at 329 (quoting Plant Food, 199 S.E. at 714). Mariano also recognizes that only rare 
circumstances require a court to void an otherwise enforceable long-term contract: 
One could guess that perhaps a million contracts have been entered into by 
all levels of government in Wyoming since 1933, and the fact that only two 
have been successfully challenged and appealed before the case at bar 
amply demonstrates that the accepted purview of the voidability principle is 
narrow and confined Application of the many cases reviewed invokes a 
description of hop-scotch law lacking consistency or logical justification 
except perforce to protect the public from seriously inopportune 
arrangements or deny predecessors] rights to hire advisors for the next 
regime. As a safety valve as corollary to the legislative jurisdiction, the 
prin ciple deserves confin ed retention. 
Mariano, 111 P.2d at 331 (emphases added). 
Under Mariano, a newly elected governing body can always assert that a contract 
entered into by its predecessor is voidable. Then, however, the burden shifts to the party 
contracting with the government, who may then raise as an affirmative defense that, at 
the time the contract was entered into, "under the facts and circumstances, [it was] 
9 
necessary and appropriate," id at 330, or "of a definable advantage to the city or 
governmental body." Id. at 332. The court must then determine, as a matter of law, 
whether the contract is enforceable. Id 
In analyzing the utility of the contract at issue, the Mariano court found no reason 
that an accounting contract with the county board of commissioners should extend for 
two years other than for "vendor economic opportunity." Id. The court did, however, 
discuss circumstances that might warrant an accounting contract for longer than one year 
(the length of the county commissioners' term) including: (1) accounting firms bidding a 
lower price for a two-year rather than one-year contract; (2) qualified accounting firms 
only agreeing to a contract for a two-year term; and (3) county commissioners requesting 
a longer contract because "experience and acquaintanceship" were important for county 
audits. Id 
In this case, the second and third circumstances the Mariano court listed were 
present when Dr. Hardy entered into the Agreement with UBMC in 1994. At that time, 
the "just cause" provision was critical to Dr. Hardy. Because Dr. Hardy was embarking 
on an enterprise to set up a network of pathology services in rural Utah, it was critical for 
him to have a commitment from UBMC. Dr. Hardy's network involved providing 
service to the Vemal\Roosevelt area, and to Price. None of these hospitals had enough 
pathology work to sustain a full-time pathologist. Only in combination did the enterprise 
provide enough work for Dr. Hardy. 
10 
Further, as a pathologist, Dr. Hardy is a "doctor's doctor" in that he works closely 
with physicians in assisting them to diagnose and treat their patients. For example, while 
operating on a patient, a surgeon will remove a sample (e.g., a frozen section) of 
potentially cancerous tissue and have it immediately examined by a pathologist while the 
patient is still on the operating table. The pathologist will then determine if the sample is 
cancerous and the extent to which the diseased tissue needs to be removed. That 
information is immediately conveyed to the surgeon who can then proceed with the 
surgery. Such a relationship demands that the treating physician be absolutely confident 
in the diagnostic skills of the pathologist. Thus, continuity and "acquaintanceship" were 
not just desirable but necessary. Under the factors identified in Mariano, this Court 
should find Dr. Hardy's contract was necessary and advantageous when the parties 
agreed to it. 
The Mariano court does note that personal service contracts with doctors, lawyers, 
and accountants involve "trust and reliance" so that there may be a greater need to allow 
termination of such contracts when trust and reliance has been impaired. Id at 331. 
However, in the case of Dr. Hardy's contract, successor UBMC boards could always 
terminate the contract if they did not trust in or could not rely upon Dr. Hardy pursuant to 
the "just cause" provision. In this case, there is no evidence that the UBMC board lost 
faith in Dr. Hardy. Rather, the UBMC board simply terminated the Agreement so that 
they could hire a pathologist who could also provide emergency room services. In 
11 
essence, what appeared to be a better deal came along, and UBMC wanted out of the 
Agreement as a matter of convenience.5 
Considering the facts and circumstances in this case, this Court should find the 
Agreement is enforceable under Mariano. At a minimum, if the Court adopts Mariano, it 
should remand the case to allow further development of a factual record so that Dr. Hardy 
can present a defense as to why the "just cause" contract was necessary and appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
III. IF TfflS COURT RETAINS THE GOVERNMENTAL/ PROPRIETARY 
TEST, IT SHOULD RULE THAT PROVIDING PATHOLOGY SERVICES 
IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
If this Court decides to retain the governmental/proprietary test for determining 
whether a long-term municipal contract is voidable, it should find that running a hospital 
is proprietary, and thus Dr. Hardy's contract is enforceable. According to UBMC, 
running a hospital is a governmental function because "a significant number of Utah 
5
 Although UBMC maintains its reason for terminating the Agreement was so that 
it could provide on-site pathology services, and, theoretically, better medical 
services to the Uintah Basin, there are serious questions as to whether UBMC 
properly investigated Dr. Alfred's credentials before deciding to hire him. For 
example, when the UBMC Board of Trustees voted to terminate Dr. Hardy's 
contract and hire Dr. Allred, it was not aware that Dr. Allred had been sanctioned 
by the State of Florida Board of Medicine for malpractice relating to a 
misdiagnosis of a lung infection as cancer. Further, the medical staff did not 
evaluate Dr. Allred's fitness or make a recommendation on whether he should be 
hired, contrary to UBMC's own by-laws. (See UBMC Bylaws, R. 999, attached 
to Dr. Hardy's opening brief as addendum D.) And UBMC offered Dr. Allred a 
position without ever talking with anyone who could comment about Dr. Allred's 
skills as a pathologist. 
12 
cases" have so held. (UBMC Br. at 23.) However, the only case that considers the issue 
after Standifordv. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980)—which re-defined 
Utah's governmental/proprietary test for tort immunity—recognized that the University 
of Utah-owned hospital functioned as a private hospital. See Condemarin v. University 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion). Justice Durham's opinion 
recognized that the simple fact that a hospital is owned by the government does not mean 
that all activities of the hospital are governmental. ". . . notwithstanding the fact that it 
is a government-owned health care facility, the University Hospital, in its patient care 
programs, virtually operates in the private sector, competing with other private, nonprofit 
entities, as well as with for-profit hospitals. In the area of patient service, it is not in the 
business of establishing government policy." Id. at 364 (plurality opinion) (emphases 
added). 
Justice Durham thus acknowledged in Condemarin what Dr. Hardy pointed out in 
his opening brief: That analysis of the governmental/proprietary distinction must focus 
on the activity at issue, not simply on whether one party is an arm of government (Hardy 
Br. at 14). Further, Justice Durham acknowledges, as Dr. Hardy has argued, that inquiry 
into whether a governmental entity may be sued must focus on whether the activity at 
issue involved formulating government policy. And Justice Durham has also recognized 
what Dr. Hardy has consistently argued, that providing patient services—which includes 
pathology services—simply does not involve government policymaking. In short, 
13 
Condemarin strongly supports the conclusion that Dr. Hardy's contract for pathology 
services involved a non-governmental function. 
UBMC attempts to distinguish Condemarin by pointing out that UBMC does not 
compete with private and non-profit hospitals as did the University Hospital, because 
UBMC runs the only hospital in Duchesne County. (UBMC Br. at 25.) While it may be 
the only hospital in Duchesne County, UBMC is in competition with the private hospital 
in Vernal, Ashley Valley Medical Center, a fact that UBMC would not deny. Thus 
UBMC differs from the University Hospital only in that the competitive market in the 
Roosevelt/Vernal area is smaller than the Salt Lake City market. 
In short, the only -post-Standiford case that considers whether operation of a 
government-owned hospital is a governmental function strongly supports Dr. Hardy's 
position that UBMC was not engaged in a governmental function when it contracted with 
Dr. Hardy for pathology services. 
UBMC's argument that operating a county hospital is necessarily a governmental 
function is equally unconvincing. UBMC claims that under Standiford, operating a 
county hospital can only be performed by a governmental agency because "it is evident 
that operating a county hospital, the establishment of which is authorized by statute . . . 
can only be accomplished by a county." (UBMC Br. at 26.) This assertion is belied by 
UBMC's admission that, in fact, the hospital is currently run by "a non-profit, 501(c)(3) 
community hospital organization." (Id. at 25 n.7.) 
14 
IV. THERE ARE COMPELLING POLICY REASONS FOR EXEMPTING 
STAGGERED AND/OR APPOINTED BOARDS FROM THE GENERAL 
RULE BARRING LONG-TERM GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS 
A. The Very Purpose of A Staggered Board Is To Allow Continuity in 
Policies, Which Requires Long-term Contracts 
Staggered government boards have been traditionally exempt from the rale barring 
long-term municipal contracts for good reason. Staggered terms of officers, whether in 
municipal or private corporations, function "to assure the continuity and stability of the 
corporation's business strategies and policies as determined by the board." Committee 
on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining to 
Directors and Officers, 54 Bus Law 1233, 1238 (May 1999).6 
This basic purpose of staggered boards is so fundamental that it is not discussed in 
the cases applying the staggered board exception. Rather, the court, or treatise, simply 
acknowledges that a staggered board is continuous, and thus "successors" cannot be 
impermissibly bound. See, eg, 10 Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations, § 29.101 ("Where a municipal body is a board or commission, the terms of 
the members of which are staggered, it is a continuous body, existing in perpetuity; and 
6
 UBMC claims that some cases Dr. Hardy cites "erroneously" refer to municipal 
bodies as corporations. (UBMC Br. at 39.) According to UBMC, comparing 
municipalities to corporations is "misguided." (Id.) However, municipalities are 
commonly described as corporate bodies, as in, for example, Eugene McQuillin's 
often-cited treatise, The Law of Municipal Corporations. The fact of the matter is 
that municipal bodies, such as the UBMC Board of Trustees, function very much 
like corporations, and borrow heavily from corporate models. 
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contracts of such a body cannot be deemed to bind or restrict successors in office."); Daly 
v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1953) (holding that because board was staggered "the 
City commission is a continuing body and may contract for any reasonable time"). It is 
clear, however, that in achieving its purpose of maintaining stable, continuous policies, a 
staggered board very often must enter into contracts that extend for more than the term of 
any single member of the board. For a staggered board to achieve continuity in policies, 
the rule barring long-term contracts should not apply. Common sense also dictates that 
the policy reason for barring long-term contracts does not come into play when a board is 
staggered. When a majority of a board remains each year, the specter of the outgoing 
political regime entering into midnight contracts, tying the new board's hands, is simply 
not possible. 
Arguing that there is no sound policy reason for exempting staggered boards, 
UBMC cites Piedmont Public Service District v. Cowart, 459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1995). Piedmont notes that policy concerns apply equally to staggered boards 
because the concern that government bodies should be free to serve the public as 
changing needs dictate "is present with all municipal bodies, whether or not the board or 
commission technically is a continuing body because the terms of its members are 
staggered or because the board has perpetual existence." Id at 882. However, as the 
court later noted, the staggered board exception does not apply if the duration of the 
contract is unreasonable. See id at 882 (citing Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of 
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Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976); Daly v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1953); 63 
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 979(b), 987). The Piedmont court held the contract at 
issue would not be enforceable under the staggered exception because 20 years "is not a 
reasonable duration for an employment contract for the administrator of a public service 
district, a position of utmost importance to the public, and one that requires the trust and 
cooperation of the commissioners." Piedmont, 459 S.E.2d at 882. Thus the staggered 
board rule does not apply when, in fact, the contract does impinge on a governing body's 
policy-making role, as the contract obviously did in Piedmont. 
The staggered board exception functions as a presumption that a long-term 
contract entered into by a staggered board, which by its nature is designed to ensure 
stability and continuity, is enforceable. But if the contract impairs an important 
government function, it will be voidable. 
Many courts, as well as treatises, have recognized the staggered board exception 
for good reasons. This Court should also recognize that staggered boards serve an 
important function for governmental bodies of providing stability and continuity in 
policies, and such boards should accordingly be allowed to enter into reasonable long-
term contracts. 
B. Appointed Boards Do Not Directly Serve The Electorate As Elected 
Boards Do 
As with staggered boards, the policy underpinning the ban on long-term 
government contracts does not apply to appointed boards. The reason the rationale does 
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not apply is that appointed board members, like the members of UBMC's Board of 
Trustees, very often serve for a period beyond the term of the elected official who 
appointed them. Such board members may continue to implement the policies of the 
elected official who appointed him or her, even after a new official, with a different 
agenda, is elected. Thus an appointed board member does not directly serve the 
electorate in the same fashion as an elected board. 
In cases where an entire new board is appointed each time a new official 
responsible for the appointments is elected, then Dr. Hardy agrees with UBMC that there 
is no distinction between an appointed and an elected board. However, most appointed 
boards, like UBMC, involve staggered appointments, with board members typically 
serving consecutive terms. In such cases, long-term contracts make sense because they 
serve the purpose of stability and continuity and because there is never a definable 
moment when a "successor" board is constituted, so there is no "successor" to be 
impermissibly bound. 
In short, policy considerations and common sense dictate that staggered, appointed 
boards should not be subject to the rule prohibiting an elected governing body from 
entering into contracts that bind successors. The very purpose of staggered, appointed 
boards—to provide continuity and stability—is undermined if they are prohibited from 
entering into contracts for more than one year. 
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V. THE "EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT" EXCEPTION IS A RECOGNIZED 
EXCEPTION, AND DOES APPLY UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS CASE 
UBMC claims that there is "no universal exception" that excepts the rule barring 
long-term municipal contracts from employment contracts. There is no doubt that the 
rules of law in the area of municipal contracts area are neither clear-cut nor consistent, 
and certainly not universal As one court observed: 
Application of the many cases reviewed invokes a description of hop-
scotch law lacking consistency or logical justification . . . . Any separately 
stated and explicitly defined principle, rule or standard applied to 
individualized factual situations found in review of precedent has as many 
holes as a rural intersection highway sign. 
Mariano, 737 P.2d at 331 n.5. And while it is difficult to extract even clear "minority" 
rules, there are a number of recognized rules in the case law and treatises, and the 
"employment contract exception" is one such recognized rule. (See Hardy Br. at 31-33.) 
UBMC does correctly point out that the employment rule essentially is a version of the 
governmental/proprietary rule, (see UBMC Br. at 43), in that the rule allows long-term 
contracts for employment positions that do not involve "governmental" functions. See 
10A Municipal Corp. § 29.101 at 46. 
However, the employment contract test is better defined than the traditional 
governmental/proprietary test. It calls for enforcement of the contract unless "the nature 
of an office or employment is such that it requires a municipal board or officer to exercise 
supervisory control" over the appointee. Id Ultimately, as demonstrated in Dr. Hardy's 
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opening brief, this inquiry focuses on whether the employee implements policy. (Hardy 
Br. at 32-33.) Because this inquiry focuses on the critical policy question of whether the 
long-term contract impairs future boards' policymaking role, it is an appropriate, 
workable test. Accordingly, this Court should find that Dr. Hardy's contract is 
enforceable under the employment contract exception.7 
VI. THE AGREEMENT'S "JUST CAUSE" PROVISION ALLOWS UBMC TO 
TERMINATE IT IF DR. HARDY'S SERVICES FAIL TO MEET THE 
NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY, A DETERMINATION WHICH IS A 
FACT QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
Throughout its brief, UBMC has claimed that it terminated Dr. Hardy's contract 
because it believed Dr. Hardy's services no longer met the needs of the medical 
community. (See UBMC Br. at 28, 29,45, 46 n .12.) As discussed earlier, UBMC did 
not offer this justification for terminating the Agreement until well into litigation on this 
case. Despite UBMC's assertions to the contrary, (UBMC Br. at 46 n .12), Dr. Hardy 
has always agreed that his failure to meet the medical needs of the community would 
constitute "just cause" under the Agreement. Dr. Hardy has maintained, however, that 
UBMC's post-termination explanation is pre-textual. The critical issue in dispute in this 
case is in fact, whether UBMC had a legitimate good-faith reason for terminating the 
7UBMC argues that Dr. Hardy did not preserve the ratification argument, and thus this Court 
cannot address it. (UBMC Br. at 47.) Dr. Hardy generally preserved for appeal the issue of 
whether UBMC could void the Agreement because it bound UBMC successor boards. (R. 991-
1018.) Dr. Hardy did not brief the ratification argument before the trial court as a separate basis 
for finding the Agreement enforceable. If the Court cannot address the merits of this argument 
because it was not separately briefed below, then this Court should nonetheless determine 
whether ratification is an available defense for parties like Dr. Hardy. 
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Agreement, i.e., "just cause." That was the sole question the trial court had reserved for 
the jury. (R. 1023.) 
Thus, UBMC's argument that the "just cause" provision of the Agreement did not 
"cure" its binding effect (UBMC Br. at 45-47), is unavailing. UBMC successor boards 
certainly could have terminated the Agreement if Dr. Hardy's services ever failed to meet 
the medical needs of the community. Thus, UBMC successor boards were not 
impermissibly bound, and the Agreement is therefore not voidable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should adopt a policy-based, case-by-case rule for determining when 
municipal contracts are enforceable against successors. Under a rule that focuses on 
whether the new board's policy-making discretion is impaired, it is clear that Dr. Hardy's 
"just cause" contract did not improperly bind UBMC successor boards. Successors could 
always terminate the Agreement if policy—such as changing needs in the community— 
so demanded. UBMC should not be allowed to terminate Dr. Hardy's contract and avoid 
paying damages simply because it is a governmental entity. Such a result is poor policy 
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